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War Tourism: A Growth Industry
Jeremy Gale *
ABSTRACT
At the founding of the country, out of fear of becoming
implicated in the wars of Europe, the United States passed the
Neutrality Laws, forbidding U.S. citizens from engaging in
conduct that would jeopardize the peaceful standing of the
country. Fast-forward approximately 200 years and, although
the military posture of the U.S. has changed significantly,
serious concerns regarding the safety of the country persist, not
in the form of external threats, but from U.S. citizens and
residents who travel overseas to align themselves with non-state
armed groups and then return home with unknown skills and
intentions.
This Note identifies deficiencies in the statutes currently used to
prosecute individuals for engaging in violent behavior overseas
and makes recommendations on how new legislation can be
crafted, or old legislation amended, to address the acts of
individuals who engage in a practice of war tourism. For
historical context and understanding, the Note briefly examines
the appearance of civilians on the battlefield through history and
how international law has struggled to address concerns similar
to those currently faced by domestic law enforcement.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In late 2014, FBI officials admitted that American citizens had been
traveling overseas to fight in the Syrian conflict, and asked for the
publics help in identifying individuals planning to travel abroad to join
terrorist groups, or who had returned from overseas combat. 1 The Bureau
noted the threat of U.S. citizens traveling overseas to fight alongside
terrorist groups is not new, and recalled the cases of four individuals
arrested for this reason within the last two years.2 The FBI was correct in
stating that civilian participation in combat, whether with terrorist
organizations or not, extends well beyond recent history, and western
security services are now dealing with the latest incarnation of this
historical phenomenon. 3
Since the beginning of the War on Terror, the presence of foreign
fighters on Afghan and Iraqi battlefields has been reported with mild
interest, possibly because it seemed natural that transnational groups
would continue to draw in like-minded individuals from sympathetic
populations the world over. 4 With the beginning of the civil war in Syria
1

Seeking Information: Help Identify Individuals Traveling Overseas for Combat,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/
2014/october/help-identify-individuals-traveling-overseas-for-combat.
2
Id.
3
DAVID MALET, FOREIGN FIGHTERS: TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITY IN CIVIL CONFLICTS
33-34 (Oxford University Press, 2013) (explaining that although transnational non-state
military groups date back 1,000 years, the more familiar foreign fighter has been around
since the early 1800s).
4
Paul Cruikshank & Tim Lister, NATO on Alert for Influx of Foreign Fighters in
Southern Afghanistan, CNN (May 25, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/
asiapcf/05/24/afghanistan.foreign.fighters/ (noting the mild interest of European
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however, the topic of foreign fighters has received much more attention
as large numbers of westerners appear on the battlefield for the first time
in the history of recent campaigns. 5 Although the total number of
individuals heading to conflict zones to fight is unclear, by some
estimates, nearly 1,000 Europeans and at least one hundred Americans
are currently or have recently been in the Middle East fighting in some
capacity. 6 While the major concern of law enforcement focuses on
extremist motivated actions, as will be discussed later in this Note, the
individual with unknown motivations is just as concerning.
Consequently, western law enforcement agencies must now confront the
spectre that attackers will not just be foreign terrorists but foreign trained
domestic citizens. At first blush, the challenge to law enforcement
appears to be logistical; how do you track and prosecute individuals in a
warzone? However, there is a more significant legal complication;
whether and how to prosecute civilian combatants who have not
collaborated with terrorists or did not intend to collaborate with them? 7
Currently, few U.S. statutes address civilians going abroad to fight in
foreign wars, and those that do, do not adequately contemplate the
current state of world affairs.
To achieve the current U.S. goal of deterring U.S. citizens from
leaving to fight, this Note will argue that it is in the United States best
interest to create a strict liability structure for any civilian who goes
overseas to fight, irrespective of their intentions or affiliations. To
provide historical context, Part II will discuss the role that civilian and
irregular forces have traditionally played in combat and examine how
international law has struggled to address this phenomenon. Part III will
introduce the statutes currently used to address citizens who fight
overseas and analyze the shortcomings of the current laws that prevent
law enforcement officials from adequately addressing non-terror
affiliated fighters. Part IV explores options for reforming existing laws
and introducing new legislation that would close some enforcement
governments in foreign fighters in Afghanistan due to their marginal effect on the
fighting).
5
Brian Murphy, Official: Over 20,000 Foreign Fighters Lured by Militant Factions
in Syria, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/official-over-20000-foreign-fighters-lured-by-militant-factions-insyria/2015/02/11/8f12eaa0-b212-11e4-827f-93f454140e2b_story.html.
6
Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Identifies Citizens Joining Rebels in Syria,
Including ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/world/
middleeast/us-identifies-citizens-joining-rebels-in-syria.html?_r=0.
7
U.S. Officials Try to Gauge Threat From American Fighters in Syria, NATL PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 27, 2014) http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/08/27/343435296/u-sofficials-try-to-gauge-threat-from-american-fighters-in-syria (discussing the story of Eric
Harroun, introduced in part II of this paper).
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loopholes. Finally, Part V briefly concludes that because the nature of
future conflicts cannot be foreseen it is strongly within the interest of
U.S. national security to prohibit all non-sanctioned civilian participation
in conflicts.

II.

THE IRREGULARITIES OF CIVILIANS IN COMBAT

The presence of irregular troops on the battlefield goes back at least
to the time of the Crusades and has roots in the mercenary soldiers who
travelled between conflicts seeking employment. 8 The mercenary
model persisted until the Napoleonic wars and the rise of the modern
nation-state, when a reliance on foreign soldiers gave way to the levée en
masse. 9 Rather than relying on foreign soldiers to supplement state
forces, the levée en masse conscripted large numbers of peasants into
military service. 10 Following the Napoleonic campaigns, France again
innovated the use of supplementary irregular forces in 1830, with the
creation of the French Foreign Legion. 11 Initially created to remove
from France those officers and soldiers . . . who were felt to be awkward,
excitable or frankly dangerous subjects for the new monarchy, while the
command structure of the Legion was French, a significant portion of the
fighting force was composed of soldiers from across Europe. 12 Over the
next 80 years, while many nations passed laws forbidding the enlistment
of citizens in foreign militaries, by the time of the Spanish Civil War, the
Legion had been reformed to be a staple component of the French
military, accepting foreign nationals from all walks of life, including
Danish princes, Eastern European mercenaries and American civilians. 13
The Spanish Civil War proved to be another significant milestone for
foreign fighters. Not only was recruitment during this time based almost
entirely on ideology, but it also saw an unprecedented level of American
involvement. 14 In response to a fascist revolt in 1936, the Spanish
government established the International Brigades to utilize volunteers

8

MALET, supra note 3.
Id. at 35-36; accord Isser Woloch, Napoleonic Conscription: State Power and Civil
Society, 111 Past and Present 101, 101-104 and 109-110 (1986).
10
Id.
11
JOHN PARKER, INSIDE THE FOREIGN LEGION 9 (Judy Piatkus Limited, 1998).
12
Id.
13
MALET, supra note 3, at 36; PARKER, supra note 11, at 80-81 and 88-89.
14
MALET, supra note 3, at 92 (noting that ideological recruitment did not serve a
single side, but rather both sides of the conflict. Moreover, both sides accepted recruits
into traditional military forces as well as irregular fighting force depending on the relative
strengths of each side).
9
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from a panoply of countries and walks of life.15 Motivated by communist
recruiters and the Great Depression, tradesmen and members of the
intelligentsia from America and elsewhere travelled to Spain to fight in
numbers sufficient to attract the attention of the U.S. State Department.16
An analysis of the motivations for the enlistment of civilians during the
Spanish Civil War reveals the modern impetus for the phenomenon. 17
Overwhelmingly, successful recruitment was not based on simple
bloodlust or the promise of riches, but on cleverly fostering personal
identification with a similarly-situated population abroad and a concern
for their safety. 18 By drawing on a diasporas connection to home or by
revealing a previously unknown connection to strangers abroad,
recruiters were able to sell to the recruit the idea that if the population
abroad was not protected, the recruit himself may one day be in jeopardy
from the same threat. 19
The same motivations have allegedly underlied the support that some
Americans have provided to foreign organizations engaged against the
United States. Shortly after the American invasion of Afghanistan in
2001, a joint force of Afghan Northern Alliance and United States
Special Forces captured an individual by the name of John Walker
Lindh. 20 In May 2001, John Lindh traveled to Pakistan and on to
Afghanistan with the stated intention of joining the Taliban to fight the
Northern Alliance. 21 Although there is some disagreement over what Mr.
Lindhs true intentions were when he traveled to Afghanistan, in 2002
Mr. Lindh pled guilty in a plea agreement to promoting terrorism by
providing services to the Taliban and to carrying an explosive during the
commission of a felony. 22 There is also the case of Al-Qaeda spokesman
Adam Gadahn. Born in Oregon and raised in California, Gadahn
15
JOHN CARVER EDWARDS, AIRMEN WITHOUT PORTFOLIO 21 (Praeger Publishers,
1997).
16
Id. at 21-22; see also MALET, supra note 3, at 98-100 (taking note of the variety of
nations which contributed citizens to the Spanish Civil War based on common
communist ideology. Also, take note of the number of irregular fighters recruited by the
communist International Brigade alone: an estimated 35,000 to 50,000 individuals).
Compare MALET, supra note 3, at 98-100 with Murphy supra note 5 (reflecting similar
numbers of recruits by both sides of the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s and ISIS today).
17
MALET, supra note 3, at 102-104.
18
Id. at 22-24.
19
Id.
20
United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002).
21
Id. at 567; Frank Lindh, How John Walker Lindh Became Detainee 001, THE
NATION (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/181414/how-john-walkerlindh-became-detainee-001# (recounting that Mr. Lindh was allegedly motivated by
religious conviction to defend civilians from the human rights abuses of non-Taliban
forces).
22
Id.
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converted to Islam in 1995 and after radicalizing in the United States,
traveled to Pakistan in the late 1990s to join Al-Qaeda. 23 In September
2006, Gadahn was indicted for treason and providing material support to
a terrorist organization and placed on the FBIs most wanted list. 24
Although the number of American citizens known to have joined
terrorist organizations is very few, recent trends show greater numbers of
American citizens jumping at the chance to participate in foreign
conflicts.25 Like specific participation rates, individual motives and
affiliations remain a point of some uncertainty. 26 Undeniably, some
American citizens are traveling to the region in order to fight with ISIS
or other extremist organizations.27 Other cases are not as clear.
During the summer of 2011, Chris Jeon, a University of California
student travelled to Libya to join the rebels.28 Although multiple
reports indicate that Mr. Jeon did not go to the region to engage in any
actual fighting, one article does quote him as saying that he was
helping the Libyan rebels. 29 A much more serious case is presented in
the story of Eric Harroun. In 2013, veteran U.S. Army Private Eric
Harroun crossed into Syria and began fighting with the Free Syrian
Army against the Assad government. 30 At some point during the six
23
See Adam Gadahn: Al-Qaedas American Voice, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/profiles/adam_gadahn/background.html?m_flipmode=4
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015) (discussing his disillusionment with Christianity and
America).
24
Investigative Highlights: Major Terrorism Preventions, Disruptions and
Investigations, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (July 8, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9-11/investigative-accomplishments/terrorisminvestigations.
25
Schmidt & Schmitt, supra note 6 (quoting American intelligence officials as saying
that more than 100 have fought alongside groups there since the civil war began three
years ago, reflecting a two-fold increase in eight months).
26
Compare Greg Bothelo & Jim Sciutto, Slain ISIS Jihadi Among More Than 100
Americans Fighting With Militants in Syria, CNN (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/26/world/meast/syria-american-killed and Daniel L.
Byman & Jeremy Shapiro, Homeward Bound? Dont Hype the Threat of Returning
Jihadists, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/
research/articles/2014/09/30-syria-foreign-fighters-byman-shapiro (noting in both articles
the unclear motives for participation by foreign fighters).
27
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 1 (discussing unknown man believed to
be from North America).
28
Joshua E. Keating, Is It Legal for Americans to Fight in Another Countrys Army?,
FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE (Sept. 2, 2011) http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/02/is-itlegal-for-americans-to-fight-in-another-countrys-army/.
29
See Id.; also see Kristen Chick, American College Kid Joins Libyan Rebels for
Vacation, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 1, 2011) http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Middle-East/2011/0901/American-college-kid-joins-Libya-rebels-for-vacation.
30
See U.S. Citizen Indicted for Conspiring to Provide Material Support to a Foreign
Terrorist Organization, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 20, 2013), http://www.
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weeks Pvt. Harroun spent fighting in Syria, he was separated from the
Free Syrian Army and continued fighting with Jabhat al-Nusra, 31 a group
designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. 32
After allegedly unknowingly fighting with a terrorist organization, Pvt.
Harroun was arrested upon his return to the United States and charged
with conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist
organization and conspiracy to use destructive devices overseas.33
Eventually able to convince prosecutors that he did not go to Syria with
the intention of joining a terrorist group, Pvt. Harroun served six months
of a possible life sentence. 34 The story of Eric Harroun is illustrative of
the challenge that security services face with civilian war tourists.35
When seemingly well-intentioned civilians travel to war zones to fight,
the fog of war may redirect their efforts to the benefit of foreign terrorist
organizations. Upon return home, the individual is placed in the position
of having to prove his innocence while law enforcement resources are
consumed pursuing what may eventually culminate in a fruitless
prosecution or wrongful conviction.
Domestic civilian jurisprudence is not the only field which has
struggled to adequately address civilians on the battlefield, however. The
changing composition of warfare in the last several decades has seen
greater civilian direct participation in combat and has placed a heavy
burden on international law to remain attentive. 36 The most pressing
concern for militaries engaged in conflict is how to distinguish between
civilians and combatants when each population seems to blend and

fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2013/u.s.-citizen-indicted-for-conspiring-to-providematerial-support-to-a-foreign-terrorist-organization; NATL PUB. RADIO, supra note 7.
31
NATL PUB. RADIO, supra note 7.
32
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/
ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
33
United States v. Harroun, 2013 WL 3131794 (E.D.Va.).
34
NATL PUB. RADIO, supra note 7.
35
For an interesting discussion of similar behavior from Europeans, See Ishaan
Tharoor, Dutch Biker Gang Members Join the Fight Against the Islamic State, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/10/
16/dutch-motorbike-gang-joins-the-fight-against-the-islamic-state/; also see John Hall &
Chris Pleasance, Now German Biker Gangs Join Their Dutch Counterparts in Fighting
Against ISIS in Kobane, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 18, 2014) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2798507/now-german-biker-gangs-join-dutch-counterparts-fighting-againstisis-kobane.html (discussing that under Dutch law, citizens are not banned from fighting
abroad, but the ultimate legality of fighting with the Kurds may be suspect since the
Kurdish PKK is classified as a foreign terrorist organization).
36
DR. NILS MELZER, INTL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 7
(2008).
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separate from the other like a kaleidoscope.37 Derived from the blackand-white principles of the Geneva Convention and its Additional
Protocols, the Law of Armed Conflict traditionally provided clear
answers to who may be targeted and when. During international armed
conflict, only non-civilian military objectives were subject to attack. 38
Civilians are defined as persons who are not members of the armed
forces of a party to the conflict, part of any organized militia or
organized resistance movement, members of armed forces not
recognized by a detaining power, or persons accompanying armed forces
or spontaneous resistance forces who act in accordance with the laws of
war. 39 During non-international armed conflicts, persons not involved in
hostilities including members of the armed forces who have laid down
their arms or are immobilized, are not subject to attack.40 However, there
is an exception to this rule for civilians who directly participate in
hostilities. 41
Just as domestic law fails to adequately address the prosecution of
individuals not aligned with terrorist organizations, international law
currently struggles to effectively control the targeting of civilians who do
not conform to the strict guidelines of the Geneva Conventions. 42 As
noted in the Judge Advocate Generals Operational Law Handbook,
although the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions takes
measures to define when civilians are exempt from protection, in practice
the application is not pragmatic. 43 In an effort to clarify engagement
principles, in 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross began
work on the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law. 44 In 2009, the
37
Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing
the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NATL SEC. J. 45, 53-54 (2010).
38
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, adopted
Aug. 6, 1977.
39
Id. at Art. 50 (citing to Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 4 A(1), (2), (3) and (6), adopted Aug. 12, 1949).
40
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 3(1)(a)-(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
41
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13(3),
adopted Aug. 6, 1977.
42
Blank & Guiora, supra note 37, at 45-47.
43
U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.S LEGAL CTR. and SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK Ch. 2, §VIII E(3)(c) 21 (2014) (noting that although the definition may be
fairly straightforward, the lack of expert consensus and complexity of the test proposed
by the International Committee of the Red Cross make a standard approach almost
impossible leading the U.S. military to adopt a case-by-case approach).
44
MELZER, supra note 36, at 5-7.
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final report of the workgroup was published, detailing revised definitions
of civilians, armed forces, and organized armed groups, by defining their
relationship to one another. 45 The Guidance also included criteria for
assessing when individuals fall under each category, exposing or
exempting them to targeting. 46
Under the Interpretive Guidance, a civilian in a non-international
armed conflict is someone who is not a member of state armed forces,
like traditional military, or an organized armed group. 47 As long as the
civilian is not directly participating in the conflict, the civilian retains
protection from attack by other parties to the conflict.48 However, the
Interpretive Guidance acknowledges the fact that in practice, the
informal and clandestine structures of most organized armed groups and
the elastic nature of membership render it particularly difficult to
distinguish between a non-State party to the conflict and its armed
forces. 49 Distinguishing civilians from fighters is further complicated by
instances of civilians engaging in hostilities on a spontaneous, sporadic
or unorganized basis. 50 To clarify when targeting is appropriate, the
Interpretive Guidance detailed three criteria which would inform whether
a person is directly involved in hostilities. First, the act must be likely to
adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to
an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction
on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of
harm). 51 Second, there must be a direct causal link between the act and
the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated
military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct
causation). 52 Finally, the act must be specifically designed to directly
cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict
and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus).53 A civilian whose
actions meet every element of the direct participation test loses his
protection from attack for such time as he is involved in direct

45

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 27-36 (explaining the when civilians and armed groups may be targeted in
non-international armed conflicts. For definitions based on international armed conflict,
see pages 20-26).
47
Id. at 27 (defining an organized armed group as a non-State party to the conflict
consisting only of individuals whose continuous function is to take direct part in
hostilities).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 33.
50
MELZER, supra note 36, at 34.
51
Id. at 46.
52
Id.
53
Id.
46
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hostilities. 54 The Interpretive Guidance also suggests that decisions on
whether someone is a civilian or a member of an armed group may be
determined by conclusive behavior, such as the repeated direct
participation in hostilities. 55 However, later in the Guidance, the authors
warn even the fact that a civilian has repeatedly taken part in direct
hostilities, either voluntarily or under pressure, does not allow a reliable
prediction as to future conduct. 56
Although the Interpretive Guidance admirably sought to create clear
and functional criteria for deciding when individuals are susceptible to
attack, several parties regarded the Interpretive Guidance as lacking the
ability to remain sensitive to the interests of states in conducting
warfare efficiently. 57 The primary criticism was the inability to
adequately address the problem of militaries that need to strike at
irregular forces that intermingle with civilian populations.58 As modern
fighters melt in and out of civilian populations, the Interpretive Guidance
urges restraint from attack due to the inability to know the current
intentions of a person who has previously participated in combat.59
However, as noted by an expert who worked on the drafting of the
Interpretive Guidance, military planners who have identified an
individual as someone continuously present in the conflict will not want
to wait to see what the individual does next when the window to
successfully execute an operation is narrow. 60
The confusion surrounding the targeting of civilians on the
battlefield provides a clear example of the difficulties inherent in trying
to identify and take action against an individual in the chaos of a
warzone. While the United State does possess the legislation necessary to
prosecute individuals who collaborate with terrorist organizations,
prosecutorial efforts fall flat when dealing with the same issues as
military planners: distinguishing casual civilian fighters from dedicated
professional fighters and identifying the relevant associations, a
persons role within an organization, and the time period encompassed
by their activities.

54

Id. at 70.
Id. at 35.
56
MELZER, supra note 36, at 71.
57
Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NATL SEC. J. 5, 6 (2010); also
see U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.S LEGAL CTR. and SCH., supra note 43
(explaining the U.S. Armys position that the ICRC criteria are too complex to be useful).
58
Schmitt, supra note 57, at 5-7.
59
MELZER, supra note 36, at 76.
60
Schmitt, supra note 57, at 23-25.
55
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THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

U.S. prosecutions of terror suspects are predominantly conducted
using sections 2339A and B of Title 18. 61 Prosecutions invoking these
sections address the provision of support of terrorist acts and terrorist
organizations. 62 After participation in a general criminal conspiracy,
charges under these sections have, by a large margin, been the primary
means of prosecuting terror suspects since 2001. 63 Title 18 also provides
several non-terrorism-based means to prosecute individuals for violent
acts under sections 956, 959, and 960. 64 While the aforementioned
statutes have proven effective in prosecuting individuals for terrorist
actions, they inadequately address the role of the modern casual
fighter. 65

A.

§ 2339A and B: Material Support

Section 2339A of the U.S. Code makes it a crime for any individual
to provide material support or resources to the acts of a terrorist and
defines this phrase as the provision of any property or services except
religious or medical items. 66 The law also requires that a person aiding
terrorist activity know[ing] or intend[ing] that the property or services
be used in the preparation or execution of a terrorist act.67 Section 2339B
provides for similar prohibitions, but focuses on the assistance to terrorist
groups rather than terrorist acts. 68 As currently drafted, § 2339B makes it
unlawful to knowingly provide[s] material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempt[s], or conspire[s] to do so.69
Under § 2339B, the definition of material support is preserved from
§ 2339A and a list of foreign terrorist organizations as defined under
section 212(a)(3)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is currently

61

CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., Terrorist Trial Report Card 13 (New York University Law
School, 2011).
62
18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
63
Terrorist Trial Report Card, supra note 61.
64
18 U.S.C. § 956 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 959 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2012).
65
I use the term casual fighter to refer to a civilian engaging in foreign conflicts, but
not engaged in traditional terrorist behavior. The terms war tourist or war tourism
have also been used, but more commonly refer to people who will tour a battlefield
without actually engaging in the conflict.
66
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) & (b)(1); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41333,
TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B 19
(2010) (explaining the relation of the outlawed behavior to the commission of a terrorist
act).
67
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
68
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
69
Id.

2014-15]

WAR TOURISM: A GROWTH INDUSTRY

129

maintained by the U.S. State Department.70 Notably, § 2339A includes in
the definition of material support or resources the provision of
personnel, including ones own self. 71
Interestingly, although both statutes read very similarly, § 2339B has
been subjected to several challenges over the constitutionality of the
prohibition on providing personnel and services to foreign terrorist
organizations. As originally drafted, the statute prohibited all support to
terrorist organizations, including nonviolent support, unless it was
medical or religious in nature.72 However, as challenged in
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, this general prohibition on providing
personnel and training was so broad and vague that it could easily
encompass seemingly legal activities.73 In Reno, political activists
distributing literature on the use of international law to resolve conflicts
sought an injunction against the enforcement of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, claiming that the use of the term
personnel in the material support clause infringed on the freedoms of
speech and association. 74 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
injunction granted by the District Court, leading to a redrafting of the
personnel language in the statute.75 With the passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act, the personnel language was revised to refer to
personnel providing expert advice or assistance. 76 Again, this language
was found to be impermissibly vague under the First Amendment. 77
Final redrafting of the language in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act refined the provision of personnel to refer to persons who
knowingly provided, attempted to provide or conspired to provide a
foreign terrorist organization, with 1 or more individuals (who may be or
include himself) to work under that terrorist organizations direction or
control to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation
of the organization. 78 Most importantly, the statute exempts individuals
who act entirely independently of a foreign terrorist organization from
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Id. at (g)(4) and (g)(6); see Foreign Terrorist Organizations supra note 32 for a
complete list of currently recognized terrorist groups.
71
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
72
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PL 104132, §§ 303 and
323, 110 Stat 1214 (1996).
73
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 1998),
affd, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
74
Id. at 1181-1186.
75
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
76
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, §805, 115 Stat 272 (2001).
77
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1200-1201 (C.D.Cal.
2004).
78
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2012).
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inclusion under the term. 79 With this final drafting, the text of the law as
it relates to material support was finally deemed to be specific enough
to provide persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited. 80 While sections A and B use the same definition for
material support, the application of the scienter requirement to a specific
offense in the original drafting of § 2339A, protected the section from
the constitutional the challenges faced by § 2339B.81

B.

§ 956 and § 960: Acts in and Against a Foreign Nation

In addition to the terrorism statutes, Title 18 also provides for
alternate means with which to prosecute terrorism suspects for acts that
affect U.S. foreign relations. Section 956 of Title 18 seeks to protect
individuals outside of the United States by targeting individuals for
prosecution who conspire within U.S. jurisdiction to murder, kidnap or
maim in any place outside of U.S. jurisdiction.82 Additionally, the statute
also forbids conspiring within the U.S. to damage the property of a
foreign nation with which the United States is at peace.83 The
prohibitions of section 956 find their roots in the Neutrality Act of 1794,
which sought to keep the United States insulated from involvement in
foreign wars. 84 Accordingly, the act has been interpreted as criminalizing
the actions of individuals within United States jurisdiction, which may
lead to a breach of neutrality. 85 To trigger a violation of Section 956, an
individual must: (1) agree with at least one other individual to commit an
act prohibited by the statute; (2) willfully join in the agreement with the
intent of furthering the conspiracys purpose; (3) commit an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) form the conspiracy with at least
one conspirator within the jurisdiction of the United States.86 When the
act targets a foreign nation and not an individual, the act must also be
perpetrated against a nation with which the United States is at peace. 87
However, the meaning of the term at peace can be highly variable
depending on the sense of th[e] law being interpreted. 88
79

Id.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 3 (2010).
81
United States v. Amawi, 545 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684-685 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
82
18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1).
83
Id. at (b).
84
The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 52 (1897).
85
Id.
86
United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 537-38 (5th Cir. 2003).
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18 U.S.C. § 956(b).
88
United States v. Yasith Chhun, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2007), affd
sub nom., 744 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 23031
(1959)).
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In the 1989 case of U.S. v. Terrell, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida investigated what it meant for the United States to be
at peace for the purposes of the neutrality statutes.89 During its
analysis, the court noted that modern warfare often involved covert
activities and undeclared warfare, rendering declarations of war
passé. 90 On this basis, despite the governments contention that a state
of peace persists until Congress has affirmed or ratified actions contrary
to a state of peace, 91 the court held that a state of war would exist where
either the executive or legislative branches of government have taken
action to intervene militarily in the affairs of a foreign nation.92 In the
later case of U.S. v. Yasith Chhun, the District Court for the Central
District of California affirmed this formula, holding that the term at
peace refers to the relationship between the United States and a foreign
country when there is no war, whether declared or undeclared. 93
However, on a post-decision motion, the District Court revisited the
notion of at peace and departed from Terrell by ruling that any state of
war would have to be open and notorious, precluding many covert
actions. 94 The Chhun court additionally departed from the holding of
Terrell on whether the state of war was a question of law or fact. 95 As an
element of the crime of conspiracy under § 956, the question of
belligerence was one that was properly left to a jury to decide after the
court had articulated the proper legal standard. 96
Like § 956, § 960 finds roots in the Neutrality Act but it provides a
more generalized prohibition against engaging in acts against foreign
nations. 97 Rather than addressing the conspiracy to act, §960 criminalizes
the actual commission of acts against foreign nations with which the U.S.
is at peace. 98 The statute requires that a military or naval expedition or
enterprise originate within the U.S. and target a foreign friendly
nation. 99 The applicability of the statute to nations with which we are at
peace, has used the same interpretation as the language in § 956. 100
89

United States v. Terrell, 731 F. Supp. 473, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 477 (note also from the recitation of the facts that financial support for military
activities will also qualify to repeal a state of peace).
93
Chhun, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1179 at 1184.
94
Order Granting Mot. In Limine, Case No. 2008 WL 793386, at 2 (C.D. Cal., Mar.
20, 2008).
95
Chhun, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1179 at 1182.
96
Id.
97
18 U.S.C. § 960 (2012).
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Id.
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Id.
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United States v. Yasith Chhun, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1179 at 1181-1182.
90

132

U. MIAMI NATL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV.

[Vol. V:118

Interestingly for the purposes of this Note, judicial interpretation has held
that the prohibition against undertaking military enterprises abroad
does extend to individuals and some non-state groups. 101 Justification for
this reading was found in the case of Wiborg v. U.S., where the Supreme
Court held that the most important factor in determining the existence of
a military expedition or enterprise, was the character of the undertaking
rather than the number of individuals participating. 102 Finally, modern
applicability of this statute to insurgent groups is not difficult to imagine.
In the 1897 case of United States v. Hart, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania specifically held that insurgent actions
against foreign nations are prohibited under § 960. 103

C.

§ 959: Enlistment in Foreign Service

Also a result of the Neutrality Act, § 959 prohibits individuals within
the United States from enlisting in the service of any foreign prince,
state, colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on
board any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer. 104 The law also
forbids individuals from actively recruiting within the United States to
get American citizens to go overseas to fight.105 Interestingly however,
the law does not forbid individuals from willingly going overseas with
the intention of enlisting in foreign service while abroad.106 The
distinction lies in the fact that an individual who goes overseas to enlist
in a foreign military surrenders his citizenship, allowing him to engage in
hostilities without compromising the neutrality of the United States. 107
To date, no cases have been prosecuted in the United States which deal
with the applicability of this law to transnational groups of a character
similar to foreign terrorist organizations or other armed groups, largely
due to the existence of other more specific legislation.108 The most recent
case to come the closest to implicating joining a foreign terrorist
organization is the 2004 case of U.S. v. Khan, which mentions a
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United States v. Sander, 241 F. 417, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (discussing prosecution of
a spy ring working on behalf of German government in World War I).
102
Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 650-652 (1896).
103
United States v. Hart, 78 F. 868, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1897) (dealing with an insurgent
force organized in the United States and dispatched against the government of Cuba).
104
18 U.S.C. § 959.
105
Id.
106
United States v. Hertz, 26 F. Cas. 293, 295 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 15,357).
107
Chacon v. Eighty-Nine Bales of Cochineal, 5 F. Cas. 390, 393 (C.C.D. Va. 1821)
(No. 2,568) affd sub nom. The Santissima Trinidad, 5 L. Ed. 454 (1822).
108
See United States v. Khan, 309 F.Supp.2d 789 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing violation
of Neutrality Act based on taking specific actions against the U.S.).
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conspiracy to violate §959, but ultimately relies on other statutes which
specifically address joining groups hostile to the United States.109

D.

Shortcomings of the Current Structure

While the current anti-terrorism and neutrality statutes have done an
excellent job of prosecuting individuals whose conduct fits into
traditional categories, they still fail to address the problem of the casual
fighter. As seen in the examples of Eric Harroun and Chris Jeon, there
exists a class of person who is willing to travel overseas alone, to engage
in combat, without interests clearly adverse to the U.S.
As currently written, § 2339A requires that prosecutors be able to
prove that an individual specifically knew or intended their actions to
further a terrorist act.110 This places a high bar of responsibility on the
government to affirmatively prove the mindset of an individual who can
avail himself of a powerful ignorance defense based on the chaos of a
battlefield setting. In order to manifest the intent necessary to expose
himself to prosecution, the fighter would have to engage in a
comprehensive analysis based on information that is imperfect to say the
least. While in a foreign combat zone, the individual will have to
transcend a possibly significant language and culture barrier to ascertain
the identity and the motives of groups alongside which he wishes to
fight. 111 After obtaining this information, the individual will then have to
undertake an analysis of the law of armed conflict to decide whether the
actions he is about to undertake conform to the accepted practices of
states at war. 112 While it is arguably very simple for any rational person
to differentiate between a valid act of war and a violation of jus cogens
norms by considering basic human morality, it is not an easy thing for a
casual combatant to correctly decide whether the destruction of a military
establishment constitutes a legal act of war or an act of terrorism. 113 As
109

Id. at 823.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a).
111
While the individual can consult the U.S. State Department website for a list of
known terrorist groups, the individual may run into trouble differentiating between such
groups as: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Asbat al-Ansar, Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Dine,
Ansaru, Army of Islam and groups of similar names which may not yet be on the list or
may not be considered terrorist groups. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note
32 for complete list.
112
See MELZER, supra note 36 at 77-78 (detailing just some of the principles to be taken
into account when assessing the proper use of force during combat).
113
Compare discussion at notes 47-56 (detailing the proper targeting of civilians) with
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5-8, July 17, 1998, 2186 U.N.T.S.
3. (describing acts which are contrary to the laws of war either due to the inherent nature
of the act or as in the case of murder, the circumstances and target of the act) and 18
U.S.C. § 2441 (detailing what the United States considers to be war crimes).
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previously discussed in Part II of this Note, even experts tasked with
operationalizing the law of armed conflict could not agree on clear tests
which combatants could follow to determine which actions place a
person within the protection of the law.114 At any step in this process an
individual could credibly claim that they never meant to engage in a
terrorist act, shielding them from prosecution due to their lack of
knowledge. While it is not unreasonable to demand that the government
adhere to a high standard when contemplating labeling someone a
terrorist, a necessary amount of flexibility must also be given to the
government to properly address criminal acts.
The same flaws are manifested in the provisions of § 2339B.
Although § 2339B assists an individual in ascertaining potential danger
by referencing a list of foreign terrorist organizations, by requiring that
an individual have intent to assist a terrorist organization, § 2339B opens
itself up to the same defenses as § 2339A.115 Again, the difficulty for
prosecutors and would-be fighters alike arises from ascertaining whom
an individual is actually fighting for. In addition to the previously
mentioned culture and language problems, individuals are confronted
with a problem that plagues experts in the field. As noted by U.S.
government officials throughout the Syrian Civil War, the number of
groups and objectives present in the conflict zone numbers into the
hundreds if not thousands. 116 By contrast, only 59 groups are designated
by the U.S. State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, placing
the burden on the individual to divine the intentions of unlabeled
groups. 117 Government officials themselves have repeatedly recited, as a
reason for not supporting moderate Syrian opposition, the fact that it is
often unclear even to them which groups are friendly or benign to U.S.
interests and which are organizations that engage in terrorist behavior. 118
If lawmakers privy to U.S. intelligence cannot ascertain the qualities of
groups they seek to support, it is highly unlikely that persons of
ordinary intelligence would be able to before it was too late.119 Indeed,
114

See Schmitt, supra note 57; also see Blank & Guiora, supra note 37.
See discussion at note 111.
116
BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, RAND CORPORATION, The Dynamics of Syrias Civil War
8 (2014).
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Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 32.
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Jeff Stein, Inside the CIAs Syrian Rebels Vetting Machine, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 10,
2014) http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/21/moderate-rebels-please-raise-your-hands283449.html.
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Id.; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, supra note 80 (discussing the standard for
judging when the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B provided proper notice to
citizens of when their behavior may violate the statute. When persons of ordinary
intelligence could ascertain that their actions would go to provide material support to
terrorist organizations, the statutory language was not held to be impermissibly vague,
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this was essentially the story of Eric Harroun and could easily have been
the story of Chris Jeon had his excursion gone differently. Even if
individuals were knowledgeable and deliberate in their decisions of who
to support and how, prosecutors would still have to overcome pleas of
ignorance from individuals who point to the difficulty that government
officials had in establishing the same information. It is entirely
conceivable that a person could draw on the stories of the men who
inspired this article and obtain military training while disclaiming
knowledge of the true ramifications of their actions. At this point in the
discussion, it is logical to wonder: why we would want individuals who
are not engaging in terrorist acts, but seemingly are working to support
the same groups and interests as the American government prosecuted
for their acts?
The simple answer to this question is deterrence. A consistent trend
through American foreign policy has been an emphasis on adherence to
neutrality when the U.S. was not involved in the conflict. 120 While the
original intent of the neutrality acts may not resonate in government
today, the statutes are still worth observing, at the very least to avoid
having American citizens fall into the custody of foreign governments or
terrorists organizations.121 Although the foreign relations statutes come
the closest to the approach later recommended by this Note, their current
formulation fails to plug the hole in the levee. § 956 of Title 18 prohibits
violent activities overseas in language easily understood by the average
individual. 122 Any conspiracy to commit acts of murder, kidnapping,
maiming or which damage the property of a nation with which the
United States is at peace will expose an individual to prosecution. 123
However, the reach of the statute falls short of modern applicability by
however the responsibility was still on the individual to find out exactly who their actions
were supporting).
120
CHARLES G. FENWICK, THE NEUTRALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 2-3 and 10
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1913) (explaining the original purpose of
neutrality laws as the codification of the principle of abstention from conflict that a nation
is not directly involved in. The principle of abstention places both active and passive
duties on a state to refrain from assisting any party to the conflict. Among these active
duties is the responsibility to prevent private persons, whether aliens or its own citizens
from cooperating with a belligerent in the use of neutral territory for hostile purposes. In
enforcing this principle a state may take whatever steps it pleases to prevent such
individuals from compromising its neutrality).
121
See generally Matt Schiavenza, Should the United States Pay Ransoms to
Terrorists?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2014) http://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2014/11/should-the-united-states-pay-ransoms-to-terrorists/382803/ (discussing
five American and English hostages captured and executed by the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria).
122
18 U.S.C. § 956.
123
Id.
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confining its terms to the existence of a conspiracy. 124 Moreover, the
statute is further limited by the requirement that the conspiracy be
formed within the jurisdiction of the United States.125
To circumvent applicability of the statute, an individual need only
travel to a foreign destination prior to the formation of the conspiracy or,
as in the case of Eric Harroun and Chris Jeon, travel abroad alone. While
this loophole may be convenient by placing the onus on foreign law
enforcement to detect and prevent a conspiracy, the ultimate goals of the
act are still frustrated by the presence of belligerent U.S. citizens
abroad. 126 The requirement that hostile acts be confined to nations with
which the U.S. is at war further stymies attempts to prevent violent acts
abroad. 127 Under current law, if an individual undertakes actions prior to
the commencement of U.S. military action, either overt or covert, the
individual has committed a crime. 128 However, if the individual waits
until the U.S. commences airstrikes or special operations, the state of
peace has dissolved and the individual has escaped the reach of § 956.
Using Syria as an example, any individual who travelled to fight
overseas before Congress made a decision to supply arms would have
been committing a crime, even though the state of peace was rapidly
dissolving between our two countries.129 By adhering to temporal criteria
for judging when someone has committed a crime, the strict reading of
the Neutrality Acts lends itself poorly to casual fighter problems. If the
country is seeking to prevent individuals from going abroad to fight, then
precluding their acts from prosecution until the U.S. has agreed to
undertake military activity completely misses the point.130 Finally, the
prohibition on committing acts only against nations with which we are at
peace runs contrary to public policy by essentially allowing U.S. citizens
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Id.
Id.
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Brooklyn Man Fights in Syria. Is He a Threat to the U.S.?, NATL PUB. RADIO (Aug.
28, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/08/28/343805340/brooklyn-manfights-in-syria-officials-unsure-of-the-threat (quoting the U.S. Attorney in Virginia who
prosecuted Eric Harroun: As a matter of policy and a matter of criminal law
enforcement, the U.S. government is just not going to stand for people going into Syria to
take up arms and fight with these groups that are in almost every instance avowedly antiAmerican).
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18 U.S.C. §956 (requiring that acts which damage property be perpetrated against
nations with which the U.S. is at peace).
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United States v. Terrell, 731 F. Supp. 473, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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See Terrell, 731 F. Supp. 473; also see United States v. Yasith Chhun, 513 F. Supp.
2d 1179, (C.D. Cal. 2007) (both discussing the provision of arms to an armed group is a
military action which indicates a state of war between the U.S. and that country).
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to go abroad and gain military skills and then return to the United
States. 131
The shortcomings of § 956 are best viewed in contrast to § 960,
which would prevent all U.S. citizens from undertaking military
expeditions or enterprises abroad, but for the limitation to nations that
the U.S. is not at peace with. 132 As previously discussed in Part II of this
Note, § 960 of Title 18 has been interpreted to apply to individuals as
well as parties who undertake military expeditions or enterprises.133 In
contrast to § 956, § 960 does not seek to address the conspiracy of
individuals to commit violent acts abroad, but instead addresses the
actual commission of those acts. 134 Consequently, if the act was not
limited in its scope by confining the application of the law only to acts
against nations the United States is at peace with, it would serve as an
effective prohibition against all persons within U.S. jurisdiction who
travel overseas to fight, irrespective of their motives or who they fight
with. Unfortunately, like § 956, the statute does include the at peace
language and consequently falls victim to the same temporal flaws.135

IV.

ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS

Law enforcement officials must now contend with a new twist on the
old concern of terrorist attacks. Previously, the most pressing concern
was that foreign nationals living in the United States or travelling to the
United States would commit attacks domestically. 136 Recent
developments in American citizen self-radicalization have shown
however that xenophobia is not an effective remedy against threats.137
Law enforcement must now also concern itself with the prospect of the
average American travelling abroad to learn to fight and then returning
home to ply his new skills against his homeland. Because it is impossible
to predict which individuals may have an interest in perpetrating attacks
in the U.S., security policy would be best served by preventing all
131
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18 U.S.C. § 960.
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See discussion at notes 101-103.
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Compare 18 U.S.C. §956 with 18 U.S.C. §960 (lacking specific reference to
conspiracy as an element).
135
Id. (both containing the requirement that the U.S. be at peace).
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The White House, National Security Strategy 1 and 19-20 (2010) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
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Hearing on Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: The Urgent Threat of Foreign
Fighters and Homegrown Terror, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Michael Steinbach,
Deputy Assistant Dir. FBI Counterterrorism Div.) available at http://docs.house.
gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20150211/102901/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-SteinbachM20150211.pdf.
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citizens and residents from undertaking military excursions without
government approval.138 To do so would be in keeping with law and
policy that has existed in this country approximately since the ratification
of the Constitution.139 Preservation of neutrality and the security of the
American homeland and citizenry can be accomplished through either
crafting new legislation to prohibit American citizens from fighting
abroad or by making revisions to Title 18 §§ 956 and 960.
If future enforcement were to occur on the basis of entirely new
legislation, it would still find an analog in current law. The Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA), codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3261, broadens the jurisdiction of the United States to allow for
domestic prosecution of criminal acts committed by Americans
overseas. 140 MEJA confines its applicability to criminal acts that would
be classified as felony offenses if committed within the maritime or
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 141 Notably, MEJA also
provides that no prosecution could be commenced under this statute if
the individual was already prosecuted or is being prosecuted by the
courts of a foreign government whose jurisdiction is recognized by the
United States. 142 This provision is especially useful in deriving a solution
to the problem presented by this Note since it implicitly acknowledges
the obvious fact that where foreign fighters are flooding into an area to
fight, there is no government with the jurisdiction and capability to
prosecute the individuals committing the offensive acts. This fact
necessitates action by countries like the United States, which possess the
willingness and capability to stem the flow of foreign fighters. In 2010,
the extraterritoriality of MEJA was unsuccessfully challenged in the case
of U.S. v. Williams. 143 Charged with the sexual abuse of a child while
living in Japan, Williams challenged Congress power to promulgate a
criminal statute with exterritorial jurisdiction.144 Citing U.S. v. CurtissWright Export Corp., the District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia rejected this challenge and reiterated the Supreme Courts
finding that Congress acquired the ability to enforce laws beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States through the powers inherent in
the sovereignty of the United States.145 Embracing the doctrine of U.S. v.
138

NATL PUB. RADIO, supra note 126.
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King, the Williams court dismissed the challenge by stating that [t]here
is no constitutional bar to the extraterritorial application of penal
laws. 146 However, the broad reach of Congress is tempered by two
criteria. First, Congress must clearly intend for the act to have
extraterritorial applicability. 147 Second, the extraterritorial nature of the
act must not contravene established principles of international law.148 So
long as the act conforms to one of the recognized justifications for
asserting criminal jurisdiction, the law will conform to international
standards and vest Congress with the power to extend the reach of
legislation beyond the shores of the U.S. 149
In 2010, David Price of North Carolina proposed a legislative
supplement to MEJA in the House of Representatives, with an identical
version of the bill introduced by Patrick Leahy of Vermont in the
Senate. 150 The Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2010 (CEJA),
proposed to extend the prohibitions of MEJA beyond individuals
employed by or accompanying the military to also include civilian
contractors employed by or accompanying any other branch of the
federal government overseas. 151 At the request of the Office of
Management and Budget, to reduce the scope of the legislation, the Act
articulated specific qualifying offenses, many of a violent nature. 152
Although the bill has failed in Congress twice, it was again reintroduced
in 2014. 153
With inspiration taken from CEJA, new legislation can be crafted to
specifically address the actions of American citizens who travel overseas
to fight. To prevent similar loopholes in the future, any new legislation
should create a blanket prohibition on American citizens who travel
overseas to engage in violent acts, acts of destabilization, insurgency or
combat unless specifically authorized by the President or the Congress
and in conformity with relevant international law. Further, the law should
apply to individuals or groups of individuals, irrespective of size, who
engage in these acts by themselves or in conjunction with irregular
forces. A prohibition on joining conventional forces would be
unnecessary, since it is already covered in the foreign relations chapter of
146
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Title 18. 154 The justification of such a law would be the desire of the
United States to hold accountable U.S. citizens who commit acts abroad
which would be illegal if committed at home. Enacting such a law may
also circumvent contentious situations like the targeted killing of
American citizens overseas who cannot easily be arrested and tried and
have been deemed enemy combatants.155
The easier remedy to the casual warrior problem may be to amend or
supplement current laws. As previously discussed, § 956 prohibits
persons under American jurisdiction from conspiring to commit
numerous acts overseas. 156 To address modern security concerns, § 956
should be amended to move beyond a narrow focus on conspiracies and
include the attempt or completion of the enumerated acts. By broadening
the scope of the statute to go beyond conspiracy, the law would succeed
in reaching situations where individuals go overseas without the
intention of undertaking violent actions, but then become involved in
such actions. For example, it is not difficult to imagine an individual who
feels compelled to go overseas to manifest support for a government
opposition group. After some time in the country however, he feels
motivated to engage in more kinetic means of opposition and takes up
arms. Under the current language of §956, even if the individual commits
murder, kidnapping, or destruction of government property, he cannot be
prosecuted because he did not formulate the intention to commit these
acts within U.S. jurisdiction.157 By criminalizing attempt or actual
commission of the acts, § 956 could fulfill its purpose by attaching to the
designated offenses at any point in the act, whether it is at the formation
of the conspiracy or the completion of a unilateral act. The latter point is
especially important to address modern trends since by definition; a
single person cannot be engaged in a conspiracy. 158 Consequently, under
current §956, if for instance a person plots to destroy the property of a
foreign government by himself he is not violating the statute. By
including attempt and completion in an amended statute, any individual
who plots or carries out an act could be prosecuted. Circumventing the
application of § 956 could also be avoided by attaching jurisdiction for
the crimes to the nationality of the individuals rather than the place in
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which the plot is hatched. 159 By criminalizing the creation of a
conspiracy by American citizens, rather than requiring the conspiracy be
formed within U.S. jurisdiction, the government could effectively hold
individuals accountable for the conspiracies they form at any place
outside of the U.S. 160 This approach is consistent with international legal
principles for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction and would provide a
more nimble means for the U.S. government to prosecute individuals
acting heinously abroad.
A more narrow prohibition, which specifically addresses the foreign
fighter problem, could be achieved through amendments to §960. Rather
than identifying specific acts that would trigger prosecution, §960
broadly targets actions which are militaristic in nature. 161 By simply
removing the requirement that military expeditions or endeavors not be
undertaken against friendly nations, § 960 would gain the broad
application necessary to stop all combat oriented travel overseas. 162 By
prohibiting all military expeditions and endeavors, regardless of
destination and diplomatic disposition, revised § 960 would end the waitand-see approach currently in use and put any person wishing to engage
in militaristic acts overseas on notice that their actions are prohibited.
While it is highly unlikely that a single individual from the U.S. would
be able to undertake actions which would lead to a full-blown state of
war between the U.S. and another country, from the perspective of
neutrality, creating a general prohibition against aggressive actions
would only serve to keep American civilians out of positions that may
help destabilize situations. In any ceasefire situation for example, the
actions of an overzealous individual or group of individuals could
endanger a fragile peace or negotiations. This scenario repeatedly plays
out in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where the actions of a few spark
weeks of heavy fighting. 163 Even if cooler heads were to prevail and
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individual actions ran no risk of instigating any type of fighting it is still
in the interest of the government to keep American citizens from falling
into compromising positions generally. Unfortunately, in the past year
multiple cases have arisen which strongly counsel against allowing
American citizens into dangerous areas. 164 While humanitarian missions
and the accurate reporting of conflicts requires some individuals to risk
capture in furtherance of their duties, no public interest is served by
having Americans be captured by foreign groups or governments while
fighting on the battlefield.165 Like § 956, § 960 vests criminal jurisdiction
in the beginning of the act taking place within the United States.166
Again, this provision would also have to be revised to vest jurisdiction in
the nationality of the individual. The language of MEJA embodies the
broad jurisdiction sought to be achieved by the recommendations of this
paper and is worth noting. MEJA simply states that whoever engages in
conduct outside of the United States, that is forbidden, will become
vulnerable to prosecution. 167
The final statute worth amending is §959 of Title 18, which seeks to
prohibit the recruitment or enlistment of citizens within the United States
into the service of foreign nations. While precedent has come very close
to including non-state actors within the meaning of the act, as previously
discussed, the last case to deal with enlistment in a foreign terrorist
organization stopped short of expanding the reach of the act.168 By
expanding the definition to go beyond traditional state forces and also
include non-state actors like armed groups, the act would be able to
address modern combat, which sees fewer state-versus-state actions
occurring. In an attempt to achieve a similar goal to § 959, Senator Ted
Cruz introduced into the 113th Congress the Expatriate Terrorists Act of
2014. 169 The purpose of the bill was to combat the risk of terrorist
affiliated American citizens returning to the country by interpreting any
support of a designated terrorist as grounds for revocation of U.S.
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nationality. 170 However, revocation of citizenship involves significant
constitutional hurdles that make passage of the act unlikely.

V.

CONCLUSION

War has never been a straightforward enterprise and modern
developments continue to thicken the fog around the issues created by
conflicts. As armed groups play an increasing role in conflict, states will
have to craft effective tools for depriving these groups of new members,
especially those who come from within their own borders. The necessity
of these measures is partially derived from the responsibilities of states to
keep their own citizens from jeopardizing the diplomatic position of the
home state. More importantly, preventing citizens from going abroad to
engage in combat is essential to avoid violent blowback against the home
state upon the return of the citizen. Consequently, countries like the
United States with significant international interests and vulnerabilities
will have to be more aggressive in policing citizens who engage in acts
that would be prohibited, but for insufficiently modern legislation.
Extending the criminal jurisdiction of the United States to reach the
conduct of U.S. citizens no matter where they are in the world is not only
a matter of good international security policy, but also good domestic
security policy.
Throughout the history of the U.S., the government has repeatedly
attempted to enforce compliance with the Neutrality Acts by
progressively criminalizing behaviors that were likely to embroil the
United States in a foreign conflict. While this historic threat has receded,
the modern threat of domestic harm stemming from an individuals
participation in a foreign conflict has risen to take its place. By
broadening criminal jurisdiction, the U.S. can conclusively address the
penchant of some individuals to go abroad and gain combat experience
without having to fit each person into the narrow definition of a terrorist.
More importantly, the U.S. would not have to turn a blind eye to the
troublesome activities of citizens and simply live with the hope that the
persons attitudes and new skills will not one day turn against their
home.
The ultimate goal of the proposed modifications is not to find new
and creative ways to expose Americans to criminal liability, but rather to
remove the uncertainty that arises when individuals take vigilante
actions. The proposed changes only seek to buttress longstanding
prohibitions by plugging loopholes that allow citizens to take action
outside the established rules and policies of the United States. By
170
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identifying and remedying these oversights, the government will regain
its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and remove American
citizens from the threat of prosecution as a terrorist, and the possibility of
death or capture on a foreign battlefield. 171
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